Abstract: In every region of the country, modern British party systems now involve at least five or six parties with significant vote shares at one election or another, a potential for legislative representation at some level, office-seeking capabilities and endurance over time, and distinctive ideological positions which are not encompassed by Labour versus Conservative differences. Whenever voters exercise their choices in proportional systems of voting (which do not forcibly suppress some preferences) they assign significant support to at least six parties, as in 2004 European election when electors in the median British region supported 5.3 effective parties. Under the current 'co-existence' of PR and plurality rule voting systems, the outcomes of PR elections have already exerted an important influence upon the development of 'major' party politics. The UK seems to closely fit a general pattern amongst liberal democracies for Duverger's Law to hold for the 'wrong' reasons. Here an increase in the effective number of parties occurs first and then it later induces incumbent political elites to shift away from plurality rule to a proportional system in order to defend their declining positions. Hence the subsequent introduction of PR does not generate any further multi-partism, but simply consolidates a change that has already happened.
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To effectively understand contemporary changes in the UK political scientists and other commentators need to completely abandon the anachronistic 'legacy' conceptual apparatus of a 'two-party system' and the assumption that voting for a party necessarily betokens positive support. Instead we need to focus on how party competition works in an era where increasingly 'dealigned' voters have multiple preferences, activated in different ways at different contests, and imposing fundamental changes in how parties campaign and choose strategies from one contest to another.
Paper for the Special Issue of Parliamentary Affairs, July 2005.
These are difficult times for the vast majority of Labour and Conservative politicians, media commentators, political historians and academics studying British party politics and voting behaviour. Influenced by the Labour and Conservative monopolies of government and their duopolistic control of the House of Commons, exponents of the orthodoxy believe that the UK is still somehow a 'two party system', where only the bi-polar conflict of the two largest contenders at general elections 'really' matters. Such commentators acknowledge a 'new phase' in the development of a resilient 'two-party' politics, but one not different in kind from earlier phases or wobbles, such as the 1920s. 1 Yet time and again modern electoral behaviours throw up apparently disconfirming indicators that voters themselves now want to support a multiplicity of parties and are disillusioned with the grip of an artificially maintained 'two-party' politics. 'Major party' politicians and most media pundits cope with this evidence to the contrary by blithely continuing to not talk about other parties, or by proclaiming 'straight choices' to voters in self-evidently multi-dimensional contests.
But intellectual honesty is increasingly typing up in knots academic voices in this vein. Here, for instance, is Richard Heffernan writing in a leading undergraduate textbook in
2003:
'The British party system has changed, but in many ways remains the same… The established party system has changed, but it has been fragmented, not overturned…
[W]hile the two-party system has clearly expanded to embrace additional parties [the
Scottish and Welsh nationalists are mentioned] only the two major parties, Labour
and Conservative, can form a single party government under Britain's electoral system. That is why, at the same time as it can no longer be described as a classical two-party system, Britain cannot be described as a genuine multi-party system. As its party system fragmented, Britain may be described as a "two party-plus" system, particularly as multi-party systems can be discerned as coming into being in the devolved assemblies in Scotland and Wales'.
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A careful reader may note multiple linguistic pressures at work here. The two-party system is changing but not changing, or alternatively fragmenting, or then again expanding to include other parties, or perhaps becoming a two party-plus system, or is no longer a 'classical' version of itself, while yet neither being a 'genuine' (as opposed to a fake?) multi-party system. Add in a bizarre implied claim that Britain only has one electoral system (in 2003!) and it is evident that contemporary conditions are indeed hard to reconcile with a 'legacy' conceptual apparatus inherited from simpler times.
Yet political science has its own developed repertoire of coping strategies for trying to ignore how voters are behaving and to pretend that things are still what they were, in line with the governing elites' pre-conceptions. A whole series of supporting myths are vigorously sustained by orthodox writers. 3 Acres of print are devoted to the scholastic concept of 'party identification', a 1950s construct designed for conditions in the USA (now the world's only two-party system?) Party ID is an artefact solely of a single, poorly designed and ultimately meaningless question (about which party survey respondents 'feel closer' to).
It serves chiefly to buttress the view that the two 'major' parties 'count' more with voters than the others. 'Only general elections count' is the widespread myth used to explain why these contests are studied in depth with ESRC funding, while other types of voting and party competition are left almost uncovered or very inadequately researched by the ESRC. An influential series of British Election Study books stretching back to the 1970s presents general election voting in complete isolation from other contests. Analysts here set out to detect trends by looking across points of analysis spaced every four or five year apart, with no intermediate histories. 4 This stance is often supported by dismissing other contexts for voting as 'secondary' elections, showing only the ephemeral mid-term dalliances of far fewer voters, casting their ballots lightly and inadvisably because they know that the 'real' issues of power at Westminster are not at stake. It is still common to hear political scientists describe the Liberal Democrats (with around a fifth of the general election vote for over thirty years and more than four dozen seats in the legislature) as a 'minor' party -although in any other country in Europe they would clearly be a major party. And most electoral analysis still implicitly assumes that votes given to parties under plurality rule somehow must indicate positive support.
Against this well-entrenched set of positions, I focus here on capturing the key analytic issues raised by Britain's transition into a radically new era of party competition. I argue that at different types of elections we now have over-lapping party systems with up to five or six serious contenders for elected office and five or six parties with distinct ideological positions, right across Great Britain (and in addition to the quite separate party system in Northern Ireland). There is a long-run trend, which shows no sign of easing up, for voters to support a wider range of parties more conditionally and more flexibly, depending chiefly on the voting system being used and the precise context of competition. These new patterns of voting across all the top five or six parties can now have major implications for election outcomes, for party strategies, for the development of political issues and for government policy. For instance, parties that approach a PR election in the same way as a plurality rule election can make serious mistakes. The roots of these changes can be traced to four contemporary developments:
-Voters have demonstrated a clear tendency to fragment their votes across more parties, creating distinctive party systems in England (with significant regional variations also), in Scotland and in Wales.
-There is a continuing process of partisan 'de-alignment' across Britain, as positive voter support for two-party politics gradually unravels.
-The 'co-existence' of plurality rule and PR elections is progressively accentuating and accelerating the transformation of both voters' alignments and parties' strategies.
-A slow-paced transition to using PR for elections has already proceeded half-way and some form of transition of representation at Westminster seems inevitable as existing multi-party politics develops further.
Contemporary party systems in Britain
How far has the electorate changed from supporting the two major parties? For traditionalists multi-party politics can be acknowledged in the peripheries of Scotland, Wales and Northern
Ireland -by implication the less important, non-metropolitan, non-heartland areas, as well as containing only minorities of the UK population. But any similar trends must always be ignored, or characteristically downgraded to the status of inauthentic 'protest' voting, when we focus on England, the metropolitan core of the UK. 5 For exponents of the orthodoxy this weak grounding is why evidence of multi-partism in English alignments vanishes like an early morning mist in the tempering fires of a general election campaign. How well does this position stand up to current voting trends and support the thesis of the two party system's resilience?
To address the issues here, I focus first on the European parties in competition in England ranged between a low of 4.7 in the south-east region to a high of 5.5 parties in the northwest and London, just a smidgeon behind the 5.9 parties in Scotland. Across Great Britain as a whole the national effective number of parties was 5.6 and the median regional score was only slightly smaller at 5.3. There is in short no evidence of anything resembling a 'two party system' in voters' alignments at these elections.
Although it is very important to register accurately how voters behave, the most esoteric exponents of the 'party system' concept (like Sartori, Mair and others) commonly insist that vote share configurations alone cannot define a party system. 9 In their view it is equally important to know how the parties position in relation to each other and structure their appeals, how they articulate the complete range of issues and how party divisions relate to underlying fundamental conflicts or issues in civil society. A key factor that sets an organized party apart from the isolated candidacies of independents is the party's endurance and ability to organize issues and to sustain an appeal to voters on multiple issues across time and space. Seen in these terms it is important to know not just which parties voters supported, but what they stood for, how sustainable their appeal was, how grounded they were in salient issues or distinct social groupings. This in turn is supposed to feed through (in however distorted a fashion under plurality or majority rule) into party representation in legislatures.
To assess this aspect, Figure 1 shows a summary picture of the party systems in Labour made a concerted effort in the run-up to the general election to rekindle its dwindli environmentalist credentials and to make initiatives on aid for Africa, in a bid to win back some support from the Greens and other left parties. And all three main parties also produc a series of policies to appeal to older voters, whom they had previously neglected. here that voter's rankings are always complete and transitive, as rational choice theory requires, and that there are no ties in the rankings, although both these simplifications are in fact highly contestable stances). To know that party A is preferred (using any measure of preference) over two other choices B and C, could mean that the voter is spoilt for choice at one end of the spectrum, with three parties they quite like. Alternatively it could mean that the voter just detects some minimal difference that makes a disliked party A still somewhat better than its even more intensely disliked rivals B and C. In other words once we junk the misleading intellectual baggage of party ID and its accompanying assumptions, from knowing top preferences alone we in fact know next to nothing about voters' preference structures. With this datum alone, we only conjecture in a vacuum about what the meaning of a vote (or 'support' or 'identification') is for the actors involved. Thanks to the obvious defects built into previous BES studies and virtually all other commercial opinion polls and academic surveys, this cloud of obscurity covers all previous general elections before 1997.
And even for more recent dates we still have absolutely no idea about people's third, fourth or fifth preferences in our most important academic surveys. Without detailed data on preference structures and on the meaning of voters' support for one party over others, we lack important information about how the electorate feel about parties, such as that shown in Figure 3 . 20 The party blobs here show combined responses by respondents in 2004 to two questions. The first asked people to say whether they could vote for each party in the future, or could never vote for that party. The second asked respondents about each party whether they liked it or disliked it. From these responses I have computed the net proportions saying they could vote for a party in future minus those who say they could not, and saying that they liked a party minus those who say they disliked it. its unprecedented peak but newer parties picked up votes. These differences between plurality and PR elections are already clear from the raw data in Figure 5 , but it is important to bear in mind also that the effective floor for the ENP score in any kind of competitive partisan situation is going to be around 1.5 parties. So to see the real impact that electoral system difference make you rally need to subtract this minimum level and look at how much increment there is under the two different classes of system. Roughly speaking plurality rule elections adds another 0.7 to 1.5 parties to the minimum level, while proportional systems add from 1.5 to 4.3 parties. Missing from the system-blind view of mainstream authors, of course, is one key explanatory variable, namely the 'psychological effect' of the electoral system itself. Figure 6 shows the deviation from proportionality (DV) scores for all the major elections in Great Britain since 1992. This standard measure is again still not covered in election orthodoxy textbooks, but it is very simply explained. seats, which is clearly a nonsensical measure to think about in relation to liberal 'alternative democracies). 30 To cope with this problem Figure 7 also shows a measure called deviation from proportionality' (or ADV score), which is calculated by multiplying the DV score by 100 and then dividing it by the total share of the votes going to the second and subsequent parties. 31 The reasoning here is that the larger the initial size of the largest pa vote the less scope inherently exists for deviations from proportionality to occur through 'leader's bias'. The ADV measure starts at zero but reaches 100 when the largest party wi all the seats available, whatever vote share it obtains. This is a relevant point to define a ceiling because if a polity goes across this line (e.g. to 110 per cent) then we cannot regar as any kind of liberal democracy. Figure 8 ). In itself though this term is quite deliberately ambiguous -it could mean either the last time a given type of election was contested (which might be four or five years ago); or the last election in which the voter took part, which could be last year or two years ago for fairly active voters. But note that in this latter sense, there can be cross-overs But Cox has argued persuasively that in fact there is nothing essential in the plurality rule election system itself that encourages the emergence of two main party blocs at a national level. 36 Cox's modification of the Duverger effect says that it operates only at the level of each individual constituency, to encourage the emergence of two major blocs within each electoral area. In Cox's view Duverger's law says nothing at all about how many parties emerge nationally, which depends on a quite separate set of factors determining how nationalized party politics is in any given country (rather than being regionalized or localized). Thus in the UK with 646 constituencies there is nothing automatic within t electoral system itself that limits the effective number of parties to two. Instead, Duv
Law properly construed implies only that the maximum number of parties within the UK cannot exceed 646*2 = 1292 parties -a proposition so stunningly banal that no one perhaps will disagree. 37 Cox's reinterpretation is extremely timely since on some reckonings the number of parties active in Indian politics under plurality rule has passed 150, as the previous major parties' representations shrinks in favour of regionalist and localist politics. Canadi politics has also seen repeated bursts of regionalist politics creating considerable turbulence in the party system. And of course the regionalization of UK politics has considerably increased with devolution. here because each party has a sixth of total votes. We also compute the local ENP score in each of the three areas, which is 2 in each case. The mean local number of parties (ENP L ), score is thus also 2. Table 2a (which is a pretty unlinked-up party system) the resulting score is a high 200. Table 2b shows what happe we consider a four party system with some more overlaps between the parties standing in each constituency -here the index drops to a still high 100. In practical politics terms mod Norris asserts incorrectly that this somehow a 'standardized form' of the DV index and then presents extensive country data in this completely misleading format. In fact the Rose index is nonsensical since (in the inverse of the DV score itself) it can only reach zero when all seats are given to a party with no votes at all -which obviously has nothing to do with any liberal democracy, nor indeed any working polity that has ever existed.
V concepts.
